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In the Indonesian historiography, the contest for market between the Chinese and indigenous traders has long attracted 
much scholarly attention, however this issue was actually only part of the story. This article seeks to elaborate the 
Japanese and Chinese import trade competition in Java during the 1930s depression. Drawing upon both primary and 
secondary historical materials, it is argued that instead of creating a time of hardships, the crisis paved the way for 
Japan’s import trade expansion. Benefiting from the creation of large market for cheap products among the customers in 
Java suffering from a decline in purchasing power and their owned trade networks, a great number of Japan products 
will soon controlle the market. The Chinese found that their well-established economic position was seriously 
threatened. Although Japan’s fast rising market domination was eventually removed, it was due to the changing of the 
socio-political environment that created major obstacles for the Japanese to maintain its position, rather than that of the 
responses of the Chinese traders.  
 






The rebirth of Japan under the Meiji era (1868-1912) 
had radically changed Japan and its relations with other 
countries. Japan emerged as a modern powerful state 
both in military and economic terms and had an equal 
position to the western colonial powers (van Dijk, 1994). 
No less important, from 1899 the Japanese received 
“European status” in the Netherlands Indies (De Graeff, 
1945; Fasseur, 1994). The modernization of Japan, 
however, posed a serious danger to the neighbouring 
countries because Japan began to demonstrate a strong 
territorial ambition (Aziz, 1955). This development 
inevitably placed Japan in a series of conflicts, 
including with China, one of its major sources of 
cultural influence. The two powers, for example, 
competed for a political hegemony over Korea and 
Formosa in 1894-1895. By the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
signed on 17 April 1895, Japan established its political 
control over the two territories (Hane, 1986; Storry, 
1963). China was forced further to cede part of her 
territory, Shantung, which was previously colonized by 
Germany to Japan in 1919 (Mouw, 1937-1938; Aziz, 
1955; Van Dijk, 1994). 
 
The competition between the two powers was not only 
in the above geographical areas, but also in other places 
where Chinese communities developed. The article 
looks at the Japanese-Chinese competition specifically 
in import trade. The geographical and temporal settings  
 
of the article are Indonesia’s most densely-populated 
island of Java during the 1930s crisis. It seeks to explain 
the Japanese import trade expansion in the island and to 
examine the responses of the Chinese business 
community. This article argues that Japan’s import trade 
expansion in Java during the crisis was facilitated by 
combined factors of decline in population’s purchasing 
power, competitive price of Japanese products, 
organizational and marketing strategies. The deterioration 
of the Japan’s role in import trade market in Java was 
primarily due to the changing political environment in 
which Japan’s business activities were run, rather than 
due to the loss of the Japanese in business competition 
to the Chinese enjoying benefits from the restrictive 




The research applies historical method. The choice is 
based on the fact that the research is categorized as a 
study of history. Therefore, historical method is the best 
way to address the subject matter. Historical method 
basically consists of four stages: 1) heuristics 
(collection of source materials); 2) external criticism 
(examining the authenticity of historical sources); 3) 
internal criticism (examining the credibility of 
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information), and 4) historiography (composing an 
historical account by synthesising credible historical 
facts) (Gottschalk, 1986).  
 
This research will draw upon both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources include official 
and organizational publications. Two major materials in 
this category are The Netherlands-Indies, which was 
published by the Department of Economic Affairs, and 
Economic Bulletin of Netherlands India, issued by the 
Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce. 
Equally important are Indisch Verslag and Economisch 
Weekblad voor Nederlandsch Indië. They were 
collected primarily from the National Library of the 
Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta. The secondary sources 
include all relevant published and unpublished materials 
collected from diverse places especially in Jember, 
Yogyakarta, Jakarta, Canberra, and Singapore.  
 
3. Result and Discussion  
 
3.1 Japan’s Import Trade Expansion 
The economic penetration of the Japanese in colonial 
Java had already occurred around the early twentieth 
century, but only from the late 1920s it intensified. This 
process reflected three major waves of the Japanese 
trade development. The first wave primarily consisted 
of itinerant traders, which was subsequently followed by 
shop owners. Together they could possibly be grouped 
under a category of retail traders. In 1914 there were 74 
Japanese shop owners and 144 Japanese employed as 
shop keepers, beside the remaining 56 itinerary traders 
of the first wave. Before the First World War the 
Japanese business mostly operated in major urban areas 
of the island, such as Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya 
(Murayama, 1998). A Chinese eyewitness said that they 
were also found in inland town of East Java, Malang 
(Tjamboek Berdoeri, 2004). Another major feature was 
that the Japanese traders still relied largely on the 
Chinese rather than on Dutch trading firms. The 
Japanese-Chinese partnership was built, for example, in 
Surabaya and Batavia with a primary objective to 
increase commercial relations for the benefits of the two 
business communities (Post, 2002). 
 
The third wave was formed by Japanese large trading 
firms. The disruption of import supplies from Europe 
resulting during the war opened the great opportunity 
for the Japanese business interests to establish their own 
trade networks. Among others, the illustrations included 
Suzuki Shoten, Mitsubishi Trading Co., Nippon Menka, 
Gosho, and Toyo Menka (Murayama, 1998). This 
development marked the beginning of a new era of the 
Japanese trade expansion in colonial Java, as observable 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia too. There were important 
events recorded during this new era. One of them was 
the establishment of the South Seas Association (Nanyô 
Kyôkai) in 1915, a communication forum for influential 
businessmen, zaibatsu (Japanese conglomerates; Howe, 
1996) leaders, and Japanese political elites. Using their 
influences, this association searched for the 
government’s support in order to protect the overseas 
Japanese business interests. They believed that with 
support of the government, the Japanese business 
groups would be able to challenge Chinese commercial 
power in colonial Java and elsewhere in Southeast Asia 
(Post, 2002). 
 
The peak of Japanese import trade expansion came 
along with the world-wide 1930s depression. The crisis 
hit very hard the economy of Java and other parts of 
colonial Indonesia, although it should be mentioned that 
the level of hardships the events had brought to the 
Indonesian population varied across regions and social 
groups. The collapse of commercial agriculture caused a 
remarkable loss in income and jobs (Boomgaard, 2000). 
Many people became unemployed with the closure of 
estates and the decisions of the remaining estate 
enterprises to cut down their operation (Furnivall, 
1939/1967; Elson, 1984). While the land rents paid to 
the Indonesian farmers in Java were cut down, those 
who were still employed in the estate enterprises and 
public offices found that their salaries and wages were 
drastically reduced (Furnivall, 1939/1967; Nawiyanto, 
2000). Unsurprisingly, the 1930s depression was 
described an economic catastrophe for colonial Indonesia 
(Dick, 1988). The national income of the population as 
a whole decreased steeply from 3,478 million guilders 
to 2,022 million guilders or a decline by 42 per cent 
(Higgins, 1963). But for Japanese traders, the depression 
years were a good time for them to strengthen their 
business operation in colonial Java. 
 
Finding a decline in prosperity and purchasing power, 
many people in Java were no longer able to afford 
European-made consumption goods. They were forced 
to adjust their expenditure by using cheaper products 
(Odenkirchen, 1936; Indisch Verslag, I, 1932/1933). 
The alternative for this was provided by Japanese 
traders selling reasonably good and cheap products 
(Stokhuysen, 1938:; Blokhuis, 1933; Morris-Suzuki, 
1984). They often advertised that their products were 
the world’s cheapest ones (Figure 1). The Japanese 
traders could sell products at a competitive price 
because costs of labour were lower in Japan than in 
European and North American countries (Booth, 2000). 
 
In the 1930s the Japanese products became much 
cheaper for three other major reasons. First, the cost of 
production was further reduced with the rising 
productivity stemming from rationalization measure 
between 1927 and 1931. Second, the devaluation of 
Japanese yen, which reduced its exchange rate from 
113.3 yen per 100 guilders in 1931 to 50.25 guilders in 
1933 and to 42.69 guilders in 1935, caused a steep fall 
in prices of the Japanese products in colonial Java. The  




Figure 1.   A Full Page Newspaper Advertisement 
Announcing a Big Sale for Two Weeks by Japan 
Shops in Surabaya. (Source: Soeara Oemoem, 10, 
14, 18, and 23 January 1933) 
 
 
third factor was the decrease in freight rates due to the 
Japan-Dutch shipping competition. This cut down 
further the prices of import products from Japan 
(Shimizu, 1988; Morris-Suzuki, 1984). Moreover, the 
geographical position of Japan offered more advantages 
to channel goods to colonial Indonesia than that of 
European and North American countries (Blokhuis, 
1933). 
 
All the above factors made a great contribution to the 
success of Japan in gaining impressive share of the 
import market in colonial Java. In a broader context, 
this achievement placed Indonesia as “Japan’s most 
important trading partner in Southeast Asian countries” 
(Brown, 1994). Despite the annual fluctuations, the 
Indonesian import trade with Japan experienced a rising 
trend (Gongrijp, 1928; Gongrijp, 1967). In 1925 the 
value of import trade with Japan was 90 millions guilder 
or 11 percent of the total imports of colonial Indonesia. 
This figure was much higher than a value of 7 millions 
guilder (1.7 per cent) recorded in 1913. By 1930, the 
value of import trade with Japan reached around 100 
millions guilder. This figure was impressive too, even 
though in relative terms, the share remained more or 
less constant. The largest share was in 1934, reaching to 
32 percent (Dick, 1989). Based on a calculation by Lim 
Hua Sing, the shares of the import trade of colonial 
Indonesia with Japan increased at average from 10 per 
cent between 1925 and 1930 to 19 between 1930 and 
1934 (Lim, 1981: Appendix I, in Brown, 1994). Japan’s 
exports grew more rapidly to Indonesia than to the 
Asian market as a whole. Anne Booth estimates that 
between 1929 and 1933, Indonesia’s imports from 
Japan, in real terms, became twofold (Booth, 1994). The 
value of Japan’s exports to Indonesia, in absolute terms, 
was also higher than to any other Asian country (Booth, 
1992; Indisch Verslag, I, 1933/1934). 
 
In several cases, even the achievement of Japan’s 
import trade in Java was more remarkable. In 1926, for 
example, Japan already took over the position of United 
Kingdoms as the largest supplier of textiles to colonial 
Indonesia (Dick, 1989). Figure 2 demonstrates the share 
of the values of Java’s cotton imports from five major 
countries. It can be seen that from 1926 imports from 
Japan accounted for more than 75 per cent of total 
values of Java’s cotton imports. The shares of Japan 
kept on rising to more than 80 per cent from 1930 
onwards. This trend was in contrast to the steep fall in 
value shares of cotton imports from the Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, which initially had been the major 
suppliers (Broek, 1942; Van der Eng, 2007). To a lesser 
extent, a decrease in values of cotton imports also 
occurred in the case of the Indonesian import trade with 
China. Besides textile, Japan gained more than 80 
percent of the cement market in Java and Madura (Dick, 
1989). In 1934 Japan was also reported to have won a 
large portion of the import trade in bicycles and canned 
fish in colonial Indonesia (Blokhuis, 1935). 
 
Apart from the growing share, imports from Japan 
became more diversified as well. Until around 1920, the 
imports from Japan consisted primarily of cotton goods 
(Murayama, 1998; Dick, 1989; Indisch Verslag, I, 
1935/1936). Several firms concentrating on textile 
imports especially cotton were the Nihon Menka 
Kabushiki Gaisha, Toyo Menka Kabushiki Gaisha, and 
Gosho Kabushiki Gaisha (Stibbe, 1927; Meta, 2008). 
Other articles were practically negligible. By 1932, 
however, more articles were imported from Japan, 
including electric bulbs, sheet iron, cast iron-tubing, 
galvanized iron roofing, wire, wire nails, electric cables, 
and accumulators. Also on the list were things like 
bicycle and spare parts, beer, fish-preserves, sweet, 
toilet soap, caustic soda, resin, cement, triplex cases, 
wall tiles, window-glass, paper, glass-ware, 
earthenware, haberdashery, small iron ware, bicycle tire, 
and carbide. With all these products, Japan transformed 
herself as a powerful competitor for European and 
American industrial producers (Furnivall, 1939/1967). 
Even in some cases, “European countries have been 
gradually driven out of the import market in the 
Netherlands Indies by Japan” (“The Netherlands Indies, 
1935). 
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The success of Japanese traders in penetrating the 
import market of Java was due to not only the cheap 
products, but to the adoption of combined strategies. 
First, unlike the European traders leaving retail trade to 
the Chinese, the Japanese soon tried to develop their 
own business network which handled both import 
activities and distribution system (Liem 1995; Boeke, 
1953).  As G.N. Carey, British Acting Commercial 
Agent at Batavia succinctly put it, “the system of 
importing and distributing Japanese wares, through 
shipping, transport, wholesale and retail sales 
organizations, entirely under Japanese control, has 
become fairly well perfected during the year 1933” 
(Sugiyama, 1994). Similarly, on Japanese networks, 
Van Mook wrote: “the rising flood of imports carried 
Japanese goods from Japanese importers, in Japanese 
ships, financed by Japanese banks, to Japanese 
warehouses in the coastal towns of Java, to be sold 
directly to the consumers through Japanese retailers far 
in the interior” (Van Mook, 1945; Van Mook, 1944).  
Meanwhile, a Dutch figure involved in the 1934 Japan-
Netherlands Indies trade negotiation, J. van Gelderen, 
wrote “one Japanese chain ran from Yokohama to the 
native village” (Van Gelderen, 1939). The strategy of 
building its own import trade network was employed 
partly due to the growing risks of relying too much on 
Chinese network. The Chinese boycotts of Japanese 
products grew in scale and intensity because of the 
increasingly tense political relations between the two 
East Asian countries (Clarence-Smith, 2000). 
 
Second, the Japanese shops in running their business 
employed indigenous salesmen too. Commenting on 
Bandung, West Java, J.S. Furnivall noted, “small 
natives lads were doing a thriving trade for their 
Japanese employers” (Furnivall, 1939/1967). Third, the 
Japanese stores sold their goods at fixed prices, 
strikingly different from common practice among the 
Asians, including the Chinese (Liem, 1995). Finally, 
The Japanese traders tried hard to have a close 
knowledge of the local market and to understand the 
psychology of the buyers (Van Gelderen, 1939). 
Commenting on Japanese sales agents, Ernest Hauser 
noted that they were persistent in winning potential 
buyers. When finding little interest in their products 
among shop owners, Japanese sales agent would 
actively ask what the customers actually wanted. After 
they observed sample goods provided by a shop owner, 
the Japanese sales agents would assure that their 
companies in Japan were able to produce the same 
articles with a much lower price (Hauser, 1941; Post, 
2002). Unsurprisingly, in the western countries the 
Japanese was popularly described as “cut-rate imitators” 
(Jones, Frost, & White, 1993). 
 
The statistics of Japanese firms and employers in Java 
indicated the significance of the Japanese business and 
their networks in Java. In 1933 there were 424 Japanese 
trading firms, consisting of 61 large trading firms and 
363 retailers. Of this total number of firms, 58 were in 
Surabaya, 32 in Jakarta, 27 in Semarang, 15 in 
Bandung, and 12 in Cirebon. About 20 Japanese shops 
operated in Kediri, Lumajang, Jember and Banyuwangi 
(Liem, 1995) George D. Larson noted in Surakarta that 
there were 27 Japanese shops and small firms (Larson, 
1990). Kenichi Goto noted that many Japanese shops 
were found around the city square, which made the area 
being alike a Japanese town, and that there a year before 
the Japanese built a Japanese school (Goto, 1988). A 
1935 colonial report revealed that the Japanese shops 
continued to mushroom across the island (Liem, 1995). 
A micro study on an East Java district town by an 
American antropologist, Clifford Geertz corroborates 
the same trend. Three Japanese shops selling cheap 
Japanese products were said to have been established 
(Geertz, 1986).  
 
One of the leading Japanese business networks was 
Nanyô Shôkai, established in 1909 by Tsutsumibayashi 
Kazue in Semarang, Central Java. In 1927 the Nanyô 
Shôkai had 20 branch shops and employed 127 Japanese 
workers, excluding Indonesians. Its branch shops were 
found in Batavia and Bandung, and other towns such as 
Cilacap, Purworejo and Blitar. Another major network 
spreading to almost all small towns in Central Java was 
controlled by Kaneko Kenji. His shop was first 
established in Kutoarjo, but later also in Muntilan, 
Magelang, Wonosobo, and Purworejo. A number of 
branch shops were also found in Kebumen, Kroya, 
Prembun and Karanganyar. Besides the two leading 
figures, there were other figures ran different Japanese 
shops. One of them was Sawabe Masao, running the 
Fuji Yôkô (Fuji Shop), the largest Japanese shop in 
Yogyakarta (Meta, 2008). Sawabe’s Fuji Shop in 
Surakarta was popular among the local aristocrats 
(Larson, 1990). Other Japanese shop owners were 
Otomo Shintarô (Otomo Shôten/Shop, in Tegal), 
Tamaki Choichi (Daruma Shôkai, Jakarta), Kida Eiji 
(Kida Shop, Bandung), and Nakagawa Anjiro (Okazaki 
Shôten, Malang) (Meta, 2008). 
 
The Japanese business population grew too. In 1919 the 
Japanese business population in Java was 564 people, 
including both employers and employees (Murayama, 
1998). By 1933 there were 543 Japanese employers in 
East Java alone, whereas in Central and West Java their 
numbers were 288 and 260 employers respectively 
(Sugiyama, 1994). No statistical data on number of 
Japanese employees are available, but it is very likely 
that there was an increase resulting from the growing 
number of Japanese shops in the island. In 1915 the 
Japanese engaging in trade accounted for 29 percent of 
the population, and by 1930 it rose to 35 percent. A 
considerable increase in number of business population 
was reported to have taken place in Surabaya 
(Murayama, 1994). Elsewhere in Java, Larson noted 
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that in 1936 the majority of the Japanese residing in 
Surakarta, Klaten, Boyolali, Sragen, Wonogiri, and 
Tawangsari (Central Java) was shop owners or their 
workers (Larson, 1990). Shimizu Hajime indicates that 
there was a rapid increase in the number of Japanese 
traders in the 1930s, while a newspaper report 
mentioned that many Japanese played a similar role to 
the Chinese (Hajime, 1994; Djawa Tengah, 31 January 
1931). 
 
3.2 Responses of the Chinese 
Unlike the consumers of Java considering cheap 
Japanese products as mitigating their difficulties 
stemming from the crisis, for many Chinese traders they 
posed a big threat (Prince, 1989). Prior to the 1929 crisis 
the Chinese had played a major role in commercial 
sector in colonial Java. But there was a significant 
change from the late 1920s. Together with the 
depression, the expanding Japanese business was 
regarded as a serious threat to many Chinese traders. 
Commenting on Yogyakarta, Governor De Cock 
described Japanese traders as the major competitor for 
the long-established Chinese businessmen (Kwartanada, 
2002). Meanwhile, Resident of Batavia, L.G.C.A. van 
der Hoek reported in 1934 that the Japanese traders 
added an extra difficulty for the Chinese, apart from the 
declining demands of goods resulting from a drop in 
people’s purchasing power (Kartodirdjo, Hatmosuprobo 
& Soeroto, 1980). For the Chinese, the Japanese were 
considered more dangerous competitor than European 
and indigenous businessmen (Liem, 1995). 
Unsurprisingly, it was reported that the competition in 
Java’s import trade grew tighter in the 1930s (Indisch 
Verslag, 1933). 
 
One of the consequences of the expanding Japanese 
import trade could be seen in the case of goods imports 
from China and Hongkong. The activities in this field 
were almost exclusively under the control of the 
Chinese trading houses. Among the list of imported 
articles, there were textiles, matches, paper, 
haberdashery, victuals, cigarettes, and canned fruits 
(Cator, 1936). As can been seen in Figure 1, the imports 
from China, including Hongkong, between 1930 and 
1935 experienced a deterioration. A sharp decline by 
around 50 percent occurred from 1930 to 1933 and the 
decline continued to occur in the following years. This 
process took place, despite the considerable growth of 
mainland China’s economy, including its modern 
industrial sector during the 1930s (Myers, 1989), and 
the bigger need of foreign market to sell their products.  
In 1933 China accounted for 7.5 per cent of the 
Indonesia’s total greys imports, while Japan made up 90 
percent of the imports. By 1935 China’s share decreased 
to 0.37 percent, while Japan’s share increased to 97 
percent. China also suffered from Japan competition in 
sheeting trade. In 1932 China and Japan made up 
respectively  51  percent  and  49  percent of the trade in  
 
Sources: Cator, 1936: 76-77; for 1936-1940, Indisch Verslag, 
II, 1941: 347. 
 
Figure 2.  Value of Colonial Indonesia’s Import from 




sheeting in Indonesia. But, the share of China decreased 
steeply to 8 percent in 1935 and that of Japan, by 
contrast, increased sharply to 91 percent (Wirodihardjo, 
1945). A 1934 colonial report revealed that the Chinese 
also suffered seriously from Japan in crockery trade 
(Indisch Verslag, I, 1934/1935). 
 
The Chinese responded the Japan’s import trade 
penetration into the Javanese market in several ways. 
Some Chinese showed their hostility to the expanding 
Japanese business which posed a real threat to their 
commercial interests. In 1927 there were already reports 
on anti-Japanese boycotts and terrors against stores 
selling Japanese products (Kwartanada, 2002 Liem, 
1995). In the 1930s anti-Japanese boycott also occurred 
(Stokhuyzen, 1938). A call for boycotting Japanese 
products was voiced, for example, by Tjung See Gan, 
one of the biggest textile importers in Batavia (Twang, 
2005). Anti-Japanese boycott was actually not a new 
phenomenon. Part of the Chinese traders had done the 
same thing earlier, for example in 1915 (Cator, 1936). 
Such an action had been quite common among the 
overseas Chinese living in the South Seas, including 
Indonesia before the 1929 depression. The actions could 
be seen as a manifestation of economic nationalism 
when they were irritated by Japan which undermined 
their trade position (Akashi, 1968).  
 
There were illustrations indicating a response to Japan 
threat in the form of terrors occurring during the 1930s. 
A shop in Yogyakarta was reported to have been 
blemished by black paint, and in another case, faeces 
were repeatedly thrown in front of shop door because of 
selling Japanese goods (Kwartanada, 2002). A similar 
terror was reported to have occurred to a shop in Besuki 
owned by Oen Sioe Lok on October 17, 1930 (Keng Po, 
25 October 1930). The picture of anti-Japanese goods 
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much different from what broke out in big cities of Java, 
including Surabaya, Semarang, Bandung, Cirebon, and 
Batavia in the 1920s, as described by Akhasi. In the 
1930s the call for closing Japan-related wholesale and 
retail stores and for using Chinese goods, and the active 
role of newspapers in demanding public support for the 
boycotts likely occurred (Akashi, 1968; Indisch Verslag, 
1938/1939). The unfriendly events, however, did not 
completely discourage a few Chinese traders in Java 
from continuing business connections with the Japanese 
because they were quite profitable (Kwartanada, 2002). 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile noting the response by the 
China government. For the economy of China, the 
Japanese import trade expansion in Java and elsewhere 
in colonial Indonesia meant a loss of important foreign 
market for its products. As shown in Figure 2, the value 
of China’s exports to colonial Indonesia decreased 
steeply from 28.4 millions guilder in 1930 to 12.6 
millions guilder in 1933 and further to 11.5 millions 
guilder in 1934. An estimate suggested that in 1934 the 
value of China’s export to colonial Indonesia decreased 
to one third of the 1929 figure (The Netherlands Indies, 
1935). An observation by Djie Ting Liat for the trade 
situation between 1934 and 1935 suggested a decline in 
China import trade in colonial Indonesia (Djie, 1935). 
This decline confirms a general observation by Eric 
Jones, Lionel Frost, and Colin White that during the 
1930s crisis China’s overseas market shrunk (Jones, 
Frost, & White, 1993). Facing the market contraction 
for its products in colonial Indonesia, the China 
government sent official delegates to Batavia to 
negotiate with the Dutch colonial government in order 
to promote closer commercial relations between the two 
countries (Cator, 1936). Meanwhile, to achieve this goal 
the Dutch colonial government established a special 
body, called the Commission for advancing Trade 
Relations with China, which was stipulated by the 
Decree of the Governor General of July 17, 1935 (The 
Netherlans Indies 1935).  Such an effort was apparently 
regarded necessary to adjust with a new environment in 
which business players operated. The next section will 
elaborate this issue. 
 
3.3 Business in a Changing Environment 
There was a crucial development which had serious 
effects on import trade in colonial Indonesia, marked by 
the promulgation of Crisis Import Ordinance (Crisis 
invoerordonanntie) in September 1933. This regulation 
gave the Dutch colonial government the rights to 
temporarily stop and to impose quota on import of 
specified articles (Prince, 1989; The Netherlands Indies, 
1936). The objectives were to protect Netherlands 
Indies Industry, to promote import trade with those 
countries constituting the principal buyers of the 
Netherlands Indies products, and to protect the interests 
of the existing importing and distributing apparatus in 
the country (The Netherlands Indies, 1936). In handling 
all matters relating regulations on import quota, the 
Dutch colonial government consulted with its official 
advisor, the Netherlands Indies Association of 
Wholesale Importers (Nederlandsch-Indische Vereeniging 
van Importeurs-Groothandelaren, NIVIG), established 
in 1934 by the main western importers in colonial 
Indonesia (Lindblad, 2003; Liem, 1995; Indisch 
Verslag, I, 1936/1937). All the restrictive measures 
taken in the 1930s reflected a shift in colonial economic 
policy from a free trade and open door orientation that 
had been set in place from around 1870 to a more 
government intervention (Booth, 1992; Barber, 1939). 
 
The restrictions impacted differently on Japan-and 
China-related business interests. Japan’s import trade 
was the first to suffer from the restrictions. Indeed, 
Japan was the primary target of the regulations. 
Curtailing the Japanese influence on the colonial 
Indonesia market was the key argument for the 
imposition of the restrictive measures (1989; Burger, 
1977/1983). The measures were intended to, As G.H.C. 
Hart put it, “prevent undue economic penetration by 
Japan” (Hart, 1942) or to counter “the so-called 
Japanese threat” (Booth, 1994). The Japan government 
described the measures as “anti-Japanese policy” (van 
Mook, 1945; Van Mook, 1944) with the issuance of the 
quota system, the share of cement import from Japan 
was restricted from 97 per cent in 1932 to 58 per cent in 
1936. Quota system was also applied to imports of 
cambric, sarong, and beer. Consequently, there was a 
steep decrease in imports of cambric from 81 per cent in 
1933 to 43 per cent in 1936. Over the same period, the 
imports of beer decreased from 62 per cent to 19 per 
cent, while import of sarongs was especially reserved 
for the Netherlands. The quota system was also applied 
to other import articles such as pottery, yarns, electric 
lamps, bicycle tires, fertilizers and several others (Dick, 
1989). All the restrictions led to the decrease in Japan’s 
share of the import trade of colonial Indonesia. A sharp 
decline in Japan’s import shares of the colonial 
Indonesia occurred between 1934 and 1937. The share 
of imports dropped from 32.5 per cent to 15 per cent 
(Dick, 1989) or a decline by more than 50 per cent. 
Parallel with this development, the freight traffic from 
Japan to colonial Indonesia declined too (The 
Netherlands Indies, 1939). 
 
Apart from Japan’s declining share in the import 
market, the Japanese business community in Java and 
elsewhere in colonial Indonesia found that operating 
business after 1933 became harder than before. Apart 
from the quota system, the enforcement of restriction on 
entering foreigners imposed further pressures on shops 
operated by the Japanese (Murayama, 1998). On June 
1933 the Minister for Colonies, Hendrik Colijn 
instructed Governor General B.C. de Jonge to arrange a 
secret system of intelligence report on Japanese people 
and their activities (Larson, 1990). Among the Dutch 
MAKARA, SOSIAL HUMANIORA, VOL. 13, NO. 2, DESEMBER 2009: 100-110 
 
106 
officials, there was a suspicion that the Japanese shops 
and other forms of Japanese activities were only a mask 
of espionage (Frederick, 1989). The suspicion grew 
stronger after 1935 and changed the Dutch view on 
Japanese community in colonial Indonesia that “they 
were hard working and quiet immigrants who held aloof 
from subversive and spying activities and gave the 
police little trouble” (Netherlands Information Bureau, 
1944). The Japanese very likely realized that there were 
colonial secret agents always spying on them. 
 
Unlike the Japanese, some Chinese were among the 
gainer of the import restrictions. With the decrease in 
volumes of goods imports from Japan, many Chinese 
traders found that part of the commercial pressures 
resulting from the Japanese competition substantially 
reduced. Moreover, almost at the same time with the 
efforts of the China government to improve business 
relations, the Chinese business community in colonial 
Indonesia had the opportunity to negotiate a 
proportional import share for their motherland, China 
(Cator, 1936). Indeed, unlike imports from Japan, the 
import trade carried out with China was not considered 
by the colonial government a real threat requiring 
immediate actions to tackle. The efforts seem to have 
given positive results. As indicated in Figure 2, from 
1935 to 1940 China’s share in the value of the 
Indonesia’s import trade tended to increase again, 
although as a whole they never exceeded the 1930 
figure. 
 
Equally important, the restrictions on textile imports 
from Japan provided the opportunity for the Chinese to 
strengthen their role in textile production. Moreover, the 
colonial government took measures to promote 
domestic textile industry in the country (Palmer & 
Castles, 1971). In some areas there emerged indigenous 
textile producers (Wertheim, 1959). But, part of them 
appeared to have been only short-lived. During the last 
years of the effective Dutch rule, there was a 
considerable loss of the Indonesians in the weaving 
industry to the Chinese (Telkamp, 1981; Van der Eng, 
2007). John O. Sutter remarked that the Chinese rapidly 
took over the weaving licenses issued to the Indonesian 
textile producers (Sutter, 1959). In 1939, for example, 
335 of the 1,500 weaving firms in Majalaya owned by 
the Indonesians were sold to the Chinese (Sitsen, 1944; 
Van der Eng, 2007). An investigation into 94 sales of 
the Indonesian-owned weaving firms in the area 
indicated that 55 per cent of the sales went to the 
Chinese (Sutter, 1959). About 30 per cent of the 
mechanized looms were under the control of the 
Chinese in 1940 and by 1942 the figure increased to 
31.5 per cent (Kroese, 1946; Robison, 1986). In 1937 
the Chinese capital also controlled 36 per cent of the 
handlooms in the same area (Antlöv & Svensson, 1991). 
In addition, other Chinese business benefited from the 
adoption of restrictive regulations, including a lamp 
bulb factory owned by Tan Tjin Lian in Cirebon 
(Wirodihardjo, 1945). Unsurprisingly, Booth estimates 
that from 1935 there was a significant increase in per 
capita income among the Chinese population in colonial 
Indonesia (Booth, 1994).  
 
Meanwhile, there were events that posed a further blow 
to the Japanese in import trade from the late 1930s. The 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 and Japan’s 
focus on war-supporting industry reduced substantially 
her ability to export. Consequently, Japan’s share of the 
colonial Indonesia imports decreased to 15 per cent in 
1938. In the same year the number of Japanese 
population for the whole of the colonial Indonesia 
decreased to around 6,500 people, consisting of 3,300 
workers and 3,200 dependents (Sato, 1994). The 
number of Japanese shops apparently decreased too. In 
1939 in Java there were only 213 Japanese shops (Post, 
2002). This figure was lower than that of Japanese 
retailers operating in the island in 1933 as mentioned 
above. The increasingly tense political relations 
between Japan and colonial Indonesia and Japan’s 
appeal to her citizens to go home marked the end of the 
Japanese import trade expansion in colonial Java. The 
last ship evacuating Japanese people, Fuji Maru, left 
Indonesia on December 2, 1941 a few days before the 




This article has indicated Japan’s rapidly growing 
position in the import trade market of Java during the 
1930s crisis. Benefiting from the shift in people’s 
preference to cheap products due to the crisis-led 
decline in purchasing power, Japan-made goods 
captured a remarkable share in the import trade market 
of Java. Even in several cases Japan’s goods were able 
to become the market leader, replacing the position 
previously taken by products from western countries. 
The most illustrative example here was textile products. 
The success of Japan’s import trade penetration in Java, 
however, was not only due to the fact that Japan 
products were cheaper than goods produced by western 
countries. Also an integral part of the expansion was the 
establishment of the Japan owned business networks 
handling import activities and distribution system, the 
employment of indigenous marketing staff, the close 
knowledge of the local market and the well 
understanding of the psychology of the buyers. 
 
The emergence of Japan as the major supplier of the 
Java’s import and the growing presence of the Japanese 
traders with their own business networks were 
immediately felt as a real threat to the Chinese. Many 
Chinese businessmen found that their long-established 
position in the import trade market was increasingly 
undermined the rapidly expanding role of the Japanese 
traders and their networks. They were badly affected by 
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the decline in import activities and distribution of goods 
originating from both western countries and the 
mainland China, which previously provided them a 
major source of profits. A relief for the Chinese business 
was obtained when Japan’s role in Java’s import trade 
shrunk with the promulgation of restrictive measures in 
the late 1930s and eventually ended by the declaration 
of war between Japan and the Netherlands Indies. But 
this episode was not the end of the Japanese-Chinese 
import trade competition in Java. A similar event 
repeated in the 1990s crisis after Japan succeeded in 
regaining the major share in the Indonesia’s import trade 
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